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is beneﬁcial to consumers in a market with a cost leader.
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1. Introduction
Persistence of price dispersion for homogeneous products is an empirical
phenomenon that contradicts textbook microeconomic theory. Some thick
markets with dozens of companies oﬀering similar products do not converge
to one price. For example, Thompson and Thompson (2006) present evidence
for unexplained variation in prices and super-marginal proﬁts for web-hosting
companies, Garrod (2007) and Clemons et al. (2002) ﬁnd similar patterns
in data collected from travel agencies and Ancarani and Shankar (2004) for
retail industry. This empirical evidence is supported by experimental studies,
for example Kalayci and Potters (2011).
One possible explanation for the observed price dispersion is the noise
introduced by active price obfuscation by companies. For instance, Baye
and Morgan (2004), Clay et al. (2001), Ellison and Ellison (2009) use data
from price comparison websites for consumer electronics to argue that re-
tailers actively engage in price obfuscation practices that frustrate consumer
search. Such practices include companies' use of ﬁctitious price comparisons
or false sale signs to deter consumer search deceptively and proﬁtably. An-
other source of noise is consumers' inherent inability to reason about multi-
dimensional goods and services exhaustively or to predict their future us-
age, even when no obfuscation eﬀorts are undertaken by companies. Hatton
(2005) provides an example from telecommunication markets, discussing how
consumers ﬁnd it diﬃcult to predict their future usage of airtime and other
dimensions of service such as voice, data, SMS and MMS.
The literature has investigated diﬀerent assumptions on market struc-
ture. For example, pricing dispersion has been shown to be the equilibrium
result of companies operating under monopoly (Rubinstein, 1993), Stack-
elberg oligopoly (Spector, 2002) or monopolistic competition (Ellison and
Wolitzky, 2008; Gabaix and Laibson, 2005; Wilson, 2004) where consumer-
or company-induced noise is present on the market. Much less attention was
paid to welfare consequences of this issue, especially when the level of noise
is exogenous to the market and represents true taste shocks or consumer
evaluation errors, similar to Perloﬀ and Salop (1985).
We introduce a model of price competition in a noisy Bertrand duopoly
where the total noise in price and demand perception in the market is con-
stant. The model enables interpretation of the source of noise coming from:
(a) companies: active obfuscation,
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(b) consumers: boundedly rational or imperfect in reasoning,
(c) environment: external shocks leading to uncertainty, like volatile cur-
rency exchange rates or gift cards, where the consumer experience de-
pends on performance of a third party.
In our model, companies are perfectly informed and aware of the noise
and consumers use noisy signals to identify the cheapest provider. In Section
2, we elaborate our assumptions on the market structure and decision making
of companies and consumers. In Section 3, we use our model to measure the
welfare eﬀects of noise.
The welfare impact of noisy pricing on consumers was investigated by
models with endogenous noise in which companies choose the level of product
complexity or obfuscation. They indicate that noise and obfuscation impact
consumers' welfare negatively. Sometimes models with endogenous noise
generate unintuitive equilibria. For example, in Laibson and Gabaix (2004)
an increase in the number of competitors can increase markups and reduce
consumer welfare. Baye and Morgan (forthcoming) show that reductions
in search costs may lead to either more or less price dispersion, depending
on the market environment. Anderson and De Palma (2002) prove that
introducing shoppers who always buy from the cheapest ﬁrm may increase
market prices. Laibson and Gabaix (2004) assume varying quality of products
and endogenous choice of noise in a market where the supplier with the
superior product has an incentive to reduce pricing obfuscation. On the
empirical side, recent experimental results by Kalayci and Potters (2011)
conﬁrm that pricing obfuscation can lead to higher average prices.
In contrast to the theoretical and empirical literature mentioned above,
we give a simple example of a model with exogenous noise where certain
level of cognitive imperfection can improve consumers' welfare. We trace this
counterintuitive result to interaction between the full rationality of companies
and the bounded cognition of consumers. Our model is an example of a simple
environment in which boundedly rational actors obtain better outcomes than
fully rational and fully informed ones.
Proofs of theorems are placed in the Appendix.
2. Bertrand Duopoly with Noisy Consumers
Consider a market with two companies 1 and 2 competing on prices with
an undiﬀerentiated product. We assume that the exact ﬁnal price paid is
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unknown to the consumer until after he commits to one of companies. Such
situation can result from future demand or price uncertainty.
The real-life examples of demand uncertainty are choosing a supermarket
to make the grocery shopping or selecting a mobile operator. Supermar-
kets and telecommunications companies oﬀer approximately identical goods
in terms of quality and variety and consumers are uncertain about the ﬁnal
market basket they purchase until they enter the shop or sign a telecommu-
nication contract. In this case, companies can introduce noise to consumers'
evaluation of their oﬀers by diﬀerentiating the prices of individual items.
A prominent example of price uncertainty is exchange rate noise when
choosing between two suppliers at known spot prices, but when each supplier
contracts in a diﬀerent currency. In this case, consumers cannot determine
the cheaper oﬀer at the date of goods delivery when they are signing the
contract.
Relevant models of consumer decision-making in noisy environments in-
clude simple sampling schemes (Spiegler, 2006), perceptron-like architectures
(Rubinstein, 1993), variations of Bayesian updating (Wilson, 2004), costly
search processes (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2008; Gabaix and Laibson, 2005) and
price diﬀerence estimation before purchase (Perloﬀ, 1985). In our model, con-
sumers select the suppliers according to the following procedure:
1. Estimate the diﬀerence between prices oﬀered by the companies (per-
ceived price diﬀerence) and choose the cheaper one. We assume that
the perceived price diﬀerence is an unbiased estimator of the diﬀerence
between expected actual prices.
2. Observe the price for the company that has been chosen (actual price).
This value is drawn independently from the perceived price diﬀerence.
In order to decide, the consumer does not have to estimate actual prices
for each company. The perceived price diﬀerence evaluation is suﬃcient. For
example, in the telecommunications case, the consumer can compare unit
prices of a one-minute voice call in mobile operators oﬀers without having to
specify the actual demand for it. However, in most cases the perceived price
diﬀerence is estimated as a diﬀerence between expected actual prices from
both companies.
We model the estimation of the perceived price diﬀerence in the case
of demand uncertainty as follows. Assume that a consumer has a set S of
possible future demand scenarios with a probability distribution H deﬁned
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over S. For each demand scheme s ∈ S, the consumer can determine exactly
the price ei(s) he will pay if he chooses to buy from company i. If the
consumer tests every s ∈ S and average the expected prices according to H,
he can minimize the expected price. However, we assume that the consumer
takes only a ﬁnite sample from S drawn according to H, and estimates the
prices ei(s) based on that sample. Such an estimator of the actual price
is unbiased; consequently the perceived price diﬀerence is unbiased. The
actual price is determined by randomizing s ∈ S according to H using the
unit prices of the chosen company.
In the case of price uncertainty, the we assume the same model, but
sample price scenarios instead of sampling demand scenarios.
We assume that distribution of perceived price diﬀerence between the i-th
and −i-th companies is Gaussian N(m−i −mi,Σ), where mi is the expected
price of the i-th company and Σ is a measure of the cognitive imprecision of
consumers. Companies have no inﬂuence on Σ. Consumers and companies
are risk neutral and the total demand is inelastic (consumers cannot opt
out of the market). Companies maximize their expected revenues by setting
expected unit prices mi given the cost of supplying the product ci.
Using these assumptions, we obtain the expected proﬁt of the i-th com-
pany Vi (mi,m−i):
Vi = F
(
m−i −mi
Σ
)
(mi − ci) (1)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian.
The ﬁrst part of the formula describes the probability that the consumer
chooses i and the second part gives the expected value of the company's
proﬁt given that it is chosen.
The next section contains discussion of properties of this model and anal-
ysis of Σ inﬂuence on welfare of consumers.
3. Inﬂuence of Price Noise on Expected Cost
To analyze the model described in Section 2, we apply the approach based
on reaction curve calculation, see for example Topkis (1978). We show that
there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of prices (mi,m−i):
Theorem 1. A unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices (mi,m−i)
exists.
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Let us denote the equilibrium unit price of i as µi. It is a function of
ci, c−i,Σ. Denote the expected proﬁt of i in equilibrium by Pi = Vi(µi, µ−i)
and i's market share Si = F
(µ−i−µi
Σ
)
. Using this notation the expected
equilibrium cost to a consumer is equal to:
C(c1, c2,Σ) = µiSi + µ−iS−i.
Equilibria of the model for diﬀerent model parameters have simple scale-
and shift-invariance properties:
Theorem 2. For a > 0 and arbitrary b we have:
µi(aci + b, ac−i + b, aΣ) = aµi(ci, c−i,Σ) + b
Si(aci + b, ac−i + b, aΣ) =Si(ci, c−i,Σ)
Pi(aci + b, ac−i + b, aΣ) = aPi(ci, c−i,Σ)
Ci(aci + b, ac−i + b, aΣ) = aCi(ci, c−i,Σ) + b.
Theorem 2 allows us consider only two speciﬁc games (c1, c2) = (0, 1)
and (c1, c2) = (0, 0) with varying Σ. Equilibria of all other games can be
directly computed from these two. Using this observation one can prove the
following:
Theorem 3. If c1 < c2 then in equilibrium µ1 < µ2. Moreover,
dµi
dcj
> 0 and
dµi
dΣ
< 0 ⇐⇒ ci < c−i − 6.683Σ.
Theorem 3 indicates that an increase in the marginal cost of any company
leads to an increase of market prices of both companies. However, an increase
in the noise level Σ may result in decreasing the expected price oﬀered by
i if the marginal cost is low enough ci < 6.683Σ. The following theorem
expresses the observation that adding noise to consumer decision-making
may have positive welfare consequences:
Theorem 4. Expected cost for consumers is minimized for Σ ≈ 0.126 ‖c2 − c1‖.
Theorem 4 is illustrated in Figure 1. When a company with lower marginal
cost is faced with noisy consumers, it will tend to keep its prices low in or-
der to avoid losing market share due to misperception eﬀects. Therefore, in
markets with heterogeneous production costs, consumers are better oﬀ when
the precision of perception expressed by Σ is limited, but non-zero.
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Figure 1: Expected ﬁnal price paid by consumers on duopoly market with marginal costs
c1 = 0 and c2 = 1. Cost to consumer is expressed as a function of noise level Σ.
4. Conclusions
In the paper we developed a simple model of Bertrand duopoly with noisy
perception of prices. We assumed that companies control average prices but
cannot inﬂuence the variance of consumers' perceptions of price diﬀerence.
This situation can result from uncertainty of the future demand (for example
on retail and telecommunication markets) or price uncertainty (for instance
in markets with foreign currency contracts).
We assumed that the estimator of price diﬀerences used by consumers fol-
lows a Gaussian distribution. Under these assumptions, we showed that there
exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of price-setting game between
companies. Equilibrium prices increase when either companies' marginal
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costs increase or when the perception noise increases, provided that the dif-
ference in marginal cost between companies is not large. Finally, the level
of noise that minimizes average costs for consumers, measured as standard
deviation of price diﬀerence estimator, is approximately equal to 12.6% of
diﬀerence between companies' marginal costs.
The results suggest that when fully rational and heterogeneous companies
compete in prices, the population of consumers with a degree of bounded
perception would be better oﬀ than perfectly informed or completely noisy
populations. The mechanism relies on the cheaper company lowering its price
due to the fear that consumers' randomness can lead consumers to choose its
competition. For example, our research explains the rationale behind Wal-
Mart Every Day Low Prices policy. In noisy markets, the cost leader with
lower prices can signal price diﬀerence only by setting even lower prices. Wal-
Mart's policy aims to reducte pricing noise generated by their competitors'
marketing strategies based on active promotion of narrow range of product
at very low prices, while keeping other products' prices high.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. First we show that for a ﬁxedm−i, the optimal response
ri(m−i) of player i is given by a unique solution to FOC. Let us calculate it
(we denote F ′(x) = f(x)):
∂Vi
∂mi
= F
(
m−i −mi
Σ
)
− f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
(mi − ci)
Σ
(2)
∂Vi
∂m−i
=
f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
(mi − ci)
Σ
(3)
∂2Vi
∂m2i
=
f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
Σ
(
(mi −m−i)(mi − ci)
Σ2
− 2
)
(4)
∂2Vi
∂m2−i
=
f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
(mi −m−i)(mi − ci)
Σ3
(5)
∂2Vi
∂mi∂m−i
=
f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
Σ
(
1− (mi −m−i)(mi − ci)
Σ2
)
(6)
There exist points pl < min(ci,m−i) and ph > max(ci,m−i) such that ∂
2Vi
∂m2i
is negative in interval (pl, ph) and positive outside interval [pl, ph].
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Revert to ∂Vi
∂mi
. It is positive for mi ≤ ci. For mi > m−i we can use the
fact that x < 0⇒ F (x) < −f(x)
x
:
∂Vi
∂mi
<
f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
mi−m−i
Σ
− f
(m−i−mi
Σ
)
(mi − ci)
Σ
For suﬃciently large mi:
Σ
mi−m−i <
mi−ci
Σ
, therefore ∂Vi
∂mi
< 0.
In the interval (ci,+∞), ∂Vi∂mi is ﬁrst decreasing from some positive value,
afterwards it has exactly one local minimum and later increases but does
not cross 0. This implies that there exists only one mi for which
∂Vi
∂mi
equals
0. Because the second derivative in this point is negative is a unique global
maximum of Vi with respect tomi and therefore the optimal response ri(m−i).
From equation 2 we get that if mi = ci then
∂Vi
∂mi
> 0. Let us show that
for mi =
m−i+ci
2
+
√(m−i−ci
2
)2
+ Σ derivative ∂Vi
∂mi
is negative:
∂Vi
∂mi
= F (U −
√
U2 + 1)− f(U −
√
U2 + 1)(U +
√
U2 + 1)
where U = m−i−ci
2Σ
. Since U <
√
U2 + 1:
∂Vi
∂mi
< −f(U −
√
U2 + 1)
U −√U2 + 1 − f(U −
√
U2 + 1)(U +
√
U2 + 1) = 0
This ﬁxes the optimal response to the following interval:
ri(m−i) ∈ I1 =
ci, m−i + ci
2
+
√(
m−i − ci
2
)2
+ Σ2

The exact value of the optimal response can be found as a unique solution
of equation ∂Vi
∂mi
= 0 in the above interval. Next, we prove that the optimal
response ri(m−i) is increasing as m−i increases. For this we use necessary
condition ∂Vi
∂mi
= 0 to calculate:
dri
dm−i
= −
∂2Vi
∂mi∂m−i
∂2Vi
∂m2i
=
Σ2 − (ri −m−i)(ri − ci)
2Σ2 − (ri −m−i)(ri − ci)
We know that ri > ci, as each company needs to remain proﬁtable. If
ri < m−i then the fraction above is positive. Let us analyze the opposite
case ri > m−i.
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First, observe that if Σ2 > (ri −m−i)(ri − ci) then the above fraction is
positive. This inequality is met for the following interval:
ri ∈ I2 = m−i + ci
2
+ (−1; 1)
√(
m−i − ci
2
)2
+ Σ.
We can see that I1 ⊂ I2, therefore the condition Σ2 > (ri −m−i)(ri − ci)
is met in equilibrium.
Summarizing 0 < dri
dm−i
< 1, such that the reaction curve for player i is
increasing as m−i, but slower than −i-th player's price m−i.
Additionally, if mi = m−i =
√
pi
2
Σ + ci then
∂Vi
∂mi
= 0. This means that
i-th player's reaction curve crosses mi = m−i line in this point. But as
0 < dri
dm−i
< 1 this is the only intersection point. This implies that reaction
curves must intersect at least once and at intersection point:
r1, r2 ∈
√
pi
2
Σ + [min(c1, c2),max(c1, c2)]
It remains to be shown that the reaction curves intersect in exactly
one point. Assume that there were two intersection points (r1,1, r2,1) and
(r1,2, r2,2). But this would imply maxi∈{1,2}
mi,1−mi,2
m−i,1−m−i,2 ≥ 1 which contradicts
the fact that 0 < dri
dm−i
< 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. We already know that there exists exactly one equilib-
rium. Thus:
∀i ∈ {1, 2} : ∂Vi
∂mi
(µi, µ−i) = F
(
µ−i − µi
Σ
)
− f
(µ−i−µi
Σ
)
(µi − ci)
Σ
= 0
If we transform ci by multiplying it by a and adding b and multiply Σ
by a, this set of equations is solved by aµi + b. Equations for Pi, Si, Ci are
calculated by substituting the transformed µi.
Proof of Theorem 3. In equilibrium ∂Vi
∂mi
(µi, µ−i) = 0.
Therefore ∂V1
∂m1
(µ1, µ2) =
∂V2
∂m2
(µ2, µ1). By rearranging this condition we
get:
2F
(
µ2 − µ1
Σ
)
− 1 = f
(
µ2 − µ1
Σ
)
((µ1 − c1)− (µ2 − c2)) /Σ
10
thus µ2 > µ1 ⇔ µ1 − c1 > µ2 − c2 and c2 > c1. Let's calculate all
derivatives of proﬁts in equilibrium point (µ1, µ2):
J = −
[
∂2Vi
∂m2i
∂2Vi
∂mi∂m−i
∂2V−i
∂mi∂m−i
∂2V−i
∂m2−i
]
.
Using the implicit function theorem:[
dµi
dci
dµ−i
dci
]
= J−1
[
∂2Vi
∂mi∂ci
∂2V−i
∂m−i∂ci
]
From the proof of Theorem 1 we have −∂2Vi
∂m2i
> ∂
2Vi
∂mi∂m−i
> 0. Therefore
det(J) > 0 and J−1 has only positive elements. Furthermore, cross deriva-
tives are as follows: [
∂2Vi
∂mi∂ci
∂2V−i
∂m−i∂ci
]
=
[
f
(µ−i−µi
Σ
)
/Σ
0
]
and the ﬁrst term is nonnegative. This implies that prices of both companies
increase with an increase of either of marginal costs ci.
Denote A = Σ−1. Using the implicit function theorem again and simpli-
fying we have:
dµi
dA
= det(J−1)
(
∂2Vi
∂mi∂m−i
∂2V−i
∂m−i∂A
+
∂2V−i
∂m2−i
∂2Vi
∂mi∂A
)
After calculating derivatives and simplifying the expression we get:
dµi
dA
= det(J−1)Af(A(µ−i − µi))(−(µ−i − c−i)− 2(µi − ci) + A2(µ−i − µi)2(µi − ci) + (µ−i − µi))
From equillibrum condition and equation 2 we have µi−ci = F (A(µ−i−µi))Af(A(µ−i−µi)) .
Introducing this into the derivative and denoting x = A(µ−i − µi) we get:
dµi
dA
= det(J−1)
(−1− F (x)(x2 − 1) + f(x)x)
We have proven that det(J−1) > 0. Therefore the sign of the expression
depends on G(x) = −1−F (x)(x2− 1) + f(x)x. Notice that G′(x) = 2xF (x)
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and it is positive for x > 0. Moreover G(0) = −3
2
and for x < 0 we have1
G(x) < f(x)
x
− 1 < −1. Summing all these conditions we have that there
exists xˆ such that x < xˆ ⇒ dµi
dA
< 0 and x > xˆ ⇒ dµi
dA
> 0. A numeric
calculation yields xˆ = 1.363. Using the equilibrium conditions we get:
x = xˆ⇔ ci = c−i − 6.618Σ
Now we see that for ci = c−i we have x = 0 so:
dµi
dA
< 0⇔ ci < c−i − 6.618Σ
Proof of Theorem 4. Without loss of generality we shall assume that c1 < c2.
The case of c1 > c2 is symmetric and only companies indices need to be
exchanged.
Assume that a certain Σ is the noise level which induces the lowest average
consumer prices for a pair (c1, c2), that is:
∀Σˆ > 0 : C(c1, c2,Σ) ≤ C(c1, c2, Σˆ)
According to Theorem 2, this assumption after substituting a = (c2−c1)−1
and b = −c1 is equivalent to the following:
C(0, 1,
Σ
c2 − c1 ) ≤ C(0, 1,
Σˆ
c2 − c1 )
If c1 6= c2 then the optimal Σ is equal to equivalent Σ for a cost pair
(c1, c2) = (0, 1) multiplied by |c2 − c1|.
The remaining challenge is to determine the optimal Σ for marginal cost
pair (0, 1). A numerical solution to this problem yields Σ = 0.125 and C =
0.892. On Figure 1 we show the shape of C for small Σ. Minimum cannot
occur for Σ > 0.25 because:
1. From Theorem 3 we know that Σ > 0.151⇒ dµi
dΣ
> 0;
2. For Σ = 0.25 we have µ1 = 0.902 and µ2 = 1.161 and they are both
greater than 0.892.
This conclusion ﬁnishes the proof.
1Again we use the fact that x < 0⇒ F (x) < − f(x)x .
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